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Abstract
Value sensitive design (VSD) is an established method for integrating values into technical design. It has been applied to 
different technologies and, more recently, to artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that AI poses a number of challenges spe-
cific to VSD that require a somewhat modified VSD approach. Machine learning (ML), in particular, poses two challenges. 
First, humans may not understand how an AI system learns certain things. This requires paying attention to values such as 
transparency, explicability, and accountability. Second, ML may lead to AI systems adapting in ways that ‘disembody’ the 
values embedded in them. To address this, we propose a threefold modified VSD approach: (1) integrating a known set of 
VSD principles (AI4SG) as design norms from which more specific design requirements can be derived; (2) distinguish-
ing between values that are promoted and respected by the design to ensure outcomes that not only do no harm but also 
contribute to good, and (3) extending the VSD process to encompass the whole life cycle of an AI technology to monitor 
unintended value consequences and redesign as needed. We illustrate our VSD for AI approach with an example use case 
of a SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing app.
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1 Introduction
There is ample discussion of the risks, benefits, and impacts 
of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Although the exact effects of 
AI on society are neither clear nor certain, AI is doubtlessly 
having a profound impact on overall human development 
and progress and it will continue to do so in the future [1–3]. 
AI is understood here as a class of technologies that are 
autonomous, interactive, adaptive, and capable of carrying 
out human-like tasks [4]. We are particularly interested in 
AI technologies based on Machine Learning (ML), which 
allows such technologies to learn on the basis of interac-
tion with (and feedback from) the environment. We argue 
that the nature of these learning capabilities poses specific 
challenges for AI design. AI technologies are more likely 
than not to acquire features that were neither foreseen nor 
intended by their designers. These features, as well as the 
ways AI technologies are learning and evolving, maybe 
opaque to humans [5].
In this article, we build on and extend an approach to 
ethical design called value sensitive design (VSD). Although 
other tools for achieving responsible research and innovation 
have been proposed [6, 7], we specifically chose VSD as the 
design methodology due to its inherent self-reflexivity. VSD 
also emphasizes an engagement with both direct and indirect 
stakeholders as a fundamental part of the design process and 
the philosophical investigation of values [8, 9].
Past research has explored how VSD can be applied 
to specific technologies such as energy systems [10, 11], 
mobile phone usage [12], architecture projects [13], manu-
facturing [14, 15], and augmented reality systems [16], to 
name a few. Similarly, it has been proposed as a suitable 
design framework for technologies emerging in both the 
near- and long-term future. Examples include the explora-
tory application of VSD to nanopharmaceuticals [17], 
molecular manufacturing [18], intelligent agent systems 
[19], and less futuristic autonomous vehicles [20, 21]. 
Although these studies provide a useful theoretical basis for 
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how VSD might be applied to specific technologies, they 
do not account for the unique ethical and technical issues 
presented by various AI systems.
To address these challenges, we suggest expanding VSD 
to include a set of AI-specific design principles. Here, we 
propose building on significant headway made recently in 
a number of AI for Social Good (AI4SG) projects that are 
becoming popular in various research circles [22]. Various 
AI-enabled technologies have already implemented prac-
tical, on-the-ground applications of the AI4SG principles 
[23]. This provides researchers with a solid foundation 
for the manifestation of ethics in practice. But AI4SG is 
nonetheless difficult and, given the multiplicity of research 
domains, practices, and design programs, its underlying 
principles remain fuzzy [24]. Still, some work has already 
been done to narrow down the essential AI4SG principles 
[3, 25].
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1 lays out the 
VSD framework. Section 2 explains why it is challenging 
to apply VSD to AI. Section 3 relates the motivations and 
description of the AI4SG principles as a way to address the 
specific challenges posed by AI to VSD. Section 4 outlines 
a design approach inspired by VSD and the AI4SG princi-
ples. To provide a preliminary illustration of this approach, 
Sect. 5 uses the example of a specific SARS-CoV-2 contact 
tracing smartphone application. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes 
the paper.
2  Value sensitive design
Value sensitive design (VSD) is a principled approach to the 
design of new technologies that take values of ethical impor-
tance into account. The original approach was developed 
by Batya Friedman and colleagues from the University of 
Washington. As the approach grew more widespread, others 
developed it further (sometimes under somewhat different 
headings, such as ‘Values at Play’ or ‘Design for Values’ 
[26, 27]).
At the core of the VSD approach is what Friedman et al. 
[28] call a tripartite methodology of empirical, conceptual, 
and technical investigations (see Fig. 1). Whether carried out 
consecutively, in parallel, or iteratively, these investigations 
involve: (1) empirical enquiries into relevant stakeholders, 
their values, and their value understandings and priorities; 
(2) conceptual enquiries into these values and their possi-
ble trade-offs; and (3) technical enquiries into value issues 
raised by current technology and the possibilities for value 
implementation into new designs.
One important issue in VSD is deciding how to iden-
tify which values should be taken into account through a 
concrete process [30]. Friedman et al. [28] propose a list 
of thirteen values that are important for the design of infor-
mation systems (human welfare, ownership and property, 
privacy, freedom from bias, universal usability, trust, auton-
omy, informed consent, accountability, courtesy, identity, 
calmness, and environmental sustainability). Others have 
opposed a setlist of values, arguing that it is better to elicit 
values from stakeholders in a bottom-up approach [31, 32]. 
Both approaches probably have their advantages and dis-
advantages. A value list may well overlook values that are 
important in a specific situation, but absent from the list; 
a bottom-up elicitation may help uncover such values, but 
it is hardly watertight as stakeholders themselves may fail 
to articulate important values or crucial stakeholders may 
not have been identified. Stakeholder values, too, may not 
always have ethical importance that should be included in 
VSD.
When it comes to the identification of values in VSD pro-
cesses for AI technologies, there are some important consid-
erations. To begin, consensus about ethical issues specific to 
AI is now widespread. These issues are not raised by more 
Fig. 1  The recursive VSD 
tripartite framework was 
employed in this study. Source: 
[29]
Conceptual Investigations
Determination and investigation of 
values from both relevant philosophical 
literatures and those explicitly elicited 
from stakeholders
Technical Investigations
Evaluation of technical limitations on the 
technology itself in terms of how they 
support or constrain identified values and 
design requirements
Empirical Investigations
Empirical evaluation of stakeholder 
values through socio-cultural norms 
followed by translation into potential 
design requirements
285AI and Ethics (2021) 1:283–296 
1 3
conventional information and communication technologies, 
or at least not to the same degree [3]. The nature of AI thus 
carries two important implications for the issue of value 
identification. First, the original VSD list of values does not 
suffice for AI. Instead, one should consider values identified 
by an AI-specific entity as a starting point. For example, 
the EU high-level expert group on the ethics of AI lists the 
following values [33, 34]: respect for human autonomy, pre-
vention of harm, fairness, and explicability. Second, some 
value list could be desirable to ensure that typical ethical 
concerns arising from AI are not overlooked. This is not to 
say that no other values should be included in the design of 
AI applications. They should, and some form of bottom-up 
elicitation may be relevant here.1 But any elicited list should 
be supplemented by principles to ensure that typical AI ethi-
cal issues are properly addressed. We propose recourse to 
the AI4SG meanings and principles, which the third section 
discusses in more detail.
3  Challenges posed by AI
AI applications pose specific challenges for VSD that are 
largely due to their self-learning capabilities. This compli-
cates the reliable integration of values into the design of 
technologies that employ AI. We start with a brief, imagi-
nary illustration, then discuss the complications that AI 
raises for VSD in more general terms.
Suppose the tax department of a certain country wants 
to develop an algorithm that helps detect potential cases of 
fraud. More specifically, the application should help civil 
servants identify tax declarations that need extra or special 
scrutiny. Now, suppose the tax department chooses to build 
a self-learning artificial neural network for this task. An arti-
ficial neural network consists of a number of input units, hid-
den units, and one or more output units, as pictured in Fig. 2.
Let us suppose that the output unit or variable is simply 
a yes/no indicating whether a specific tax declaration needs 
additional scrutiny. The input variables (units) can be many. 
For example, they might include the amount of tax owed by 
a certain citizen, the use of specific tax exemptions, prior 
history (such as suspected fraud in the past), and any num-
ber of other personal details (age, sex, home address, etc.) 
(Fig. 2).
The units (variables) in the artificial neural network are 
connected as shown in Fig. 2. Connections between units can 
be weighted factors that are learned by the algorithm. This 
learning can be supervised or not [35]. If supervised learning 
is applied, the algorithm may learn to make calls on which 
tax declarations merit further scrutiny—calls that are similar 
to those of experienced civil servants within the tax depart-
ment. In the case of unsupervised learning, information on 
which scrutinised cases led to the detection of actual fraud 
may be fed back into the algorithm. The algorithm may then 
be programmed to learn to select cases that have the highest 
probability of leading to actual fraud detection [36].
Now, one of the values that are obviously important in 
the design of such an algorithm is ‘freedom from bias’. This 
value was included on the original list proposed by Friedman 
and Kahn [37]. Friedman and Nissenbaum [38] define ‘bias’ 
in reference to “computer systems that systematically and 
unfairly discriminate against certain individuals or groups of 
individuals in favour of others” (p. 332). In traditional VSD, 
there are a number of ways this value may be implemented 
into algorithm design. First and foremost, it can be translated 
into design requirements that no variables within the artifi-
cial neural network (the nodes in Fig. 2) use as they may lead 
to an unwanted bias. Ethnicity, for example, maybe ruled out 
as a potential variable. But this is not enough to ensure the 
realisation of the value ‘freedom from bias’, as biases may 
also be introduced through proxy variables. Postal codes 
can be a proxy variable for ethnicity, so one may also need 
to rule out the use of such proxies to ensure ‘freedom from 
bias’ [39, 40].
Fig. 2  An artificial neural network
1 Bottom-up approaches can be informed by the actual processes of 
participatory design and of responsible research and innovation, such 
as those by Abebe et al. 2020; Liao and Muller 2019; Whitman et al. 
2018; Smith and Iversen 2018. They can also be informed by emerg-
ing regulation on constraining data collection practices as well as the 
design of AI systems (as relates to ‘protected characteristics’, human 
oversight, and informational roles, for example) [73, 74].
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Still, a self-learning algorithm can be biased due to the 
way it learns [41]. For instance, it could be biased because 
the training set for the algorithm is not representative or oth-
erwise skewed. If a form of supervised learning is chosen, 
the algorithm might conceivably learn biases that exist in 
human judgments rendered for supervisory learning. Yet if 
these potential sources of bias are also excluded, there is still 
no guarantee that the resulting algorithm will be unbiased—
and certainly not if a form of non-supervised (reinforcement) 
learning is chosen. One issue is that the resulting artificial 
neural network may be described as following a certain rule 
even if this rule was never encoded or (easily) derived from 
the nodes (variables) in the artificial neural network [c.f. 42]. 
In other words, the resulting algorithm might conceivably be 
described as following a rule that is somehow biased without 
this result being foreseeable or even clearly discernible.
Bias in the algorithm of this imaginary case could thus 
be emergent and opaque. Bias is emergent in the sense that 
it is an unintended and unforeseen consequence of the way 
the algorithm has learned. It is opaque in the sense that the 
bias may not be immediately clear or detectible from human 
inspection of the algorithm or artificial neural network.
The point generally applies beyond both this specific 
example and the value ‘freedom from bias’ (or fairness). 
Due to their self-learning capabilities, AI systems (espe-
cially those powered by ML) may develop features that were 
never intended or foreseen—or even foreseeable—by their 
designers.2 This means they may have unintended value 
consequences. It could even imply they might unintention-
ally ‘disembody’ values embedded in their original design 
[43, 44]. Unintended features may not always be discern-
ible as they could be due to specific ways the algorithm has 
developed itself—ways that are hard or even impossible for 
humans to fully understand.
These issues are not necessarily insurmountable. In the 
case of the imaginary algorithm used by the tax office, tech-
nical solutions could at least make it much less likely for the 
system to develop in a biased direction: we might tell the 
algorithm to optimise itself not only in terms of effectiveness 
(as expressed in some number or rate of fraud detection), but 
also in terms of fairness (such as presenting a non-biased 
selection of cases for investigation) [41].
The salient point is that addressing emergence and opac-
ity requires a set of design principles, or rather norms, that 
are not needed for traditional technologies. Some of these 
norms relate to technical or design requirements. Others 
concern organisation of the design process and the future life 
cycle of a product (continued monitoring, for instance). Still, 
others may address which AI techniques to use or not use. 
The next section looks at the AI4SG principles proposed as 
a way to address the specific challenges posed to VSD by AI.
4  AI4SG meaning and factors
Thorough work on the harmonisation of AI4SG values was 
undertaken recently by Cowls et al. (2019) who focus on 
factors that are “particularly relevant” to AI (not exhausting 
the potential list of relevant factors). The seven principles 
that are particularly relevant for orienting AI design towards 
social good are: (1) falsifiability and incremental deploy-
ment; (2) safeguards against the manipulation of predictors; 
(3) receiver-contextualised intervention; (4) receiver-contex-
tualised explanation and transparent purposes; (5) privacy 
protection and data subject consent; (6) situational fairness; 
and (7) human-friendly semanticisation [25].
Although discussed separately, the seven factors naturally 
co-depend and co-vary with one another. Thus, they should 
not be understood as a rank-ordered hierarchy. Similarly, 
they each relate in some way to at least one of the four ethi-
cal principles laid out by the EU High-Level Expert Group 
on AI: respect for human autonomy, prevention of harm, 
fairness, and explicability. This mapping onto the more 
general values of ethical AI is not insignificant as any diver-
gence from these more general values has potentially delete-
rious consequences. The function of the seven factors, then, 
is to specify these higher-order values into more specific 
norms and design requirements (Fig. 3).
We briefly describe the AI4SG principles below.
(1) Falsifiability and incremental deployment
  Falsifiability is defined as “the specification…and the 
possibility of empirical testing” [25, p. 5]. This means 
other values implicated in AI design are predicated on 
their ability to be falsifiable or essential to the architec-
ture of a technical system. Continued empirical testing 
must be undertaken in different contexts (which obvi-
ously cannot be exhausted without full deployment) to 
best ascertain the possible failures of a system. Hence 
there is a need for an incremental deployment cycle in 
which systems are introduced into real-world contexts 
only when a minimum level of safety warrants it.
(2) Safeguards against the manipulations of predictors
  The manipulation of predictors can lead to a range of 
potentially deleterious outcomes for AI, moving away 
from the boons promised by the AI4SG values. This 
is described as the outcome of the “manipulation of 
input data as well as overreliance on non-causal indi-
cators” [25, p. 57]. Along with the over-espoused but 
2 Although ML is chosen as the type of self-learning AI system in 
this paper, the VSD challenges posed by AI systems of this type are 
not exclusive to ML per se. In fact, most approaches to AI learning 
are combinatory/hybrid approaches involving different types of ML 
and ANN systems. Thus at the very least, they pose VSD challenges 
similar to the types explained here.
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underthought value of transparency, overreliance on 
non-causal indicators often leads to the gamification 
of systems. Those who understand which inputs lead 
to which outputs can then gamify systems to yield their 
desired ends [5, 45].
(3) Receiver-contextualised intervention
  The co-construction and co-variance of technol-
ogy with the user implicates a delicate balancing act 
between how artefacts affect user autonomy. Within the 
context of technological design and development, user 
autonomy is a value of particular importance [46]. To 
balance the false positives and false negatives that can 
result in sub-optimal levels of user-based technology 
interventions, users can be given optionality. As one 
possible route for balancing interventions on autonomy, 
user optionality is contextualised from “information 
about users’ capacities, preferences and goals, and 
the circumstances in which the intervention will take 
effect” [25, p. 9].
(4) Receiver-contextualised explanation and transparent 
purposes
  The aims of any given system must be transparent. 
That is, the operations carried out by a system should 
be explainable so as to be understood. The evermore 
ubiquitous deployment of AI systems is already under-
way. The need for explainability and transparency in 
their operations and goals has likewise garnered much 
attention due to the potential harms that can result from 
opaque goals and operations [5, 47, 48]. In relation to 
(3), information on system operations and objectives 
should be similarly receiver-contextualised [25].
(5) Privacy protection and data subject consent
  Scholarship on privacy protection and subject con-
sent is both rich and nuanced, encompassing decades 
of socio-ethical, legal, and other perspectives on the 
topics. As privacy forms the basis for good policy and 
just democratic regimes [49], AI4SG programs naturally 
make it an essential factor [50]. Tensions and bounda-
ries between different levels or understandings of user 
data processing and use have already been explored, 
and there are nuanced proposals for how to adequately 
address them [51, 52]. Stakeholder data is foundational 
to the usability and efficacy of AI systems, so AI4SG 
systems seek a sufficient balance that respects the values 
of stakeholders in regards to data processing and storage.
(6) Situational fairness
  As mentioned in (5), datasets are critical to the func-
tion of AI systems. Datasets can be biased on account 
of multiple factors (dataset collection, selection, 
categorisations, etc.). The resulting function of any 
given system will provide similarly biased results [5]. 
Biased decision-making can be of ethical importance 
because sets may involve ethically-relevant categories 
of data (such as race, gender, or age, among others) 
[38]. Recursive improvements to systems only exacer-
bate bias if designed/trained with biased datasets. The 
propagation of bias in datasets must thus be avoided if 










































Fig. 3  Relationship between higher-order values of the EU HLEG on AI and AI4SG norms
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(7) Human-friendly semanticisation
The task of managing or maximising the “semantic capital” 
of agents must be essential to the design of AI4SG systems. 
Floridi (2018) defines semantic capital as “any content that 
can enhance someone’s power to give meaning to and make 
sense of (semanticise) something” [53, p. 483]. AI allows for 
the automation of semanticisation, or making sense of things. 
If done haphazardly, the results may be ethically problematic. 
Arbitrary semanticisation can lead to results attributing mean-
ing in ways that do not map onto our own understandings 
(random meaning-making). Dataset exposure may also be too 
limited, allowing for the propagation of narrow meanings; AI 
semanticisation will likewise be too narrow, thus limiting the 
redefinition or interpretation of things [54].
This section has condensed the seven essential factors 
critical to the design of AI4SG systems proposed by Floridi 
et al. (2020). Let us now see how these factors might help 
to overcome the challenges posed to VSD by AI, which we 
discussed in the previous section. We focus on the specific 
example given in Sect. 2. First, principle 6 would require 
“remov[ing] from relevant datasets variables and proxies 
that are irrelevant to an outcome” [25, p.18]. This is in line 
with the traditional VSD approach, but it is not enough as 
AI bias may be emergent and/or hidden (opaque). Princi-
ple 1 is particularly important for addressing the emergent 
character of bias, particularly the emphasis on incremental 
development. This is primarily a procedural requirement 
that requires monitoring and extending VSD to the full-life 
cycle of design, which we discuss in greater detail in the 
next section. To avoid opacity, AI4SG principles 4 and 7 are 
important. It should be noted that sometimes, the principles 
imply certain ML techniques should not be used.
5  Adapting the VSD approach
To address the challenges posed to VSD by AI, we propose 
a modified VSD approach. The modifications we propose 
are threefold: (1) integrating AI4SG principles into VSD as 
design norms from which more specific design requirements 
can be derived; (2) distinguishing between values promoted 
by design and values respected by design to ensure the 
resulting outcome does not simply avoid harm but also con-
tributes to doing good, and (3) extending the VSD process 
to encompass the whole life cycle of an AI technology to be 
able to monitor unintended value consequences and redesign 
the technology as needed. We begin by briefly explaining 
these new features and then sketch the overall process.
5.1  Integrating AI4SG principles as design norms
We propose mapping the AI4SG principles onto the ‘norms’ 
category used to translate values into technical design 
requirements, and vice versa, as outlined by Van de Poel 
(2013) (see Fig. 4).
5.2  Distinguishing between promoted values 
and respected values
For a VSD approach to AI to be more than just avoiding 
harm and actually contributing to social good, there must 
be an explicit orientation toward socially desirable ends. 
Such an orientation is still missing in current proposals for 
AI4SG. We propose addressing this through an explicit ori-
entation toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
proposed by the United Nations, as the best approximation 
of what we collectively believe to be valuable societal ends 
(Fig. 5).
5.3  Extending VSD to the entire life cycle
To address the emergent and possibly undesirable properties 
that AI systems acquire as they learn, we propose extend-
ing VSD to the full life cycle of AI technologies. VSD 
will allow continued monitoring for potential unintended 
value consequences and technological redesign as needed 
[44, 56]. Indeed, the first AI4SG principle voices a similar 
idea: “AI4SG designers should identify falsifiable require-














Fig. 4  Values hierarchy. Source: Van de Poel, 2013
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“outside world” [25, p. 7]. The need for ongoing monitoring 
arises from uncertainties accompanying the introduction of 
new technologies in society [57].
The resulting VSD process is illustrated in Fig. 6. Given 
that each AI system design has different uses and thus dif-
ferent value implications, the illustration serves as a general 
model for engineers to use as a guide throughout their design 
program.
We suggest that VSD for AI proceeds in four iterative 
phases briefly described below:
1. Context analysis: motivations for design differ across 
projects. For this reason, there is no normative starting 
point from which all designers begin. VSD acknowl-
edges that technology design can begin with the dis-
crete technology itself, the context for use, or a certain 
value as a starting point. In all cases, the analysis of 
context is crucial. Different contextual variables come 
into play to impact the way values are understood (in 
the second phase), both in conceptual terms as well as 
in practice, on account of different socio-cultural and 
political norms. The VSD approach sees eliciting stake-
holders in sociocultural contexts as imperative. This will 
determine whether the explicated values of the project 
are faithful to those of the stakeholders, both directly 
and indirectly. Empirical investigations thus play a key 
role in determining potential boons and downfalls for 
any given context.
2. Value identification: the second phase concerns iden-
tification of a set of values to form a starting point for 
the design process. We suggest three main sources for 
such values. One source is the values promoted by the 
design, such as by deriving from the SDGs. Another 
source is those respected by the design, particularly the 
values identified in relation to AI (respect for human 
autonomy, prevention of harm or nonmaleficence, 
fairness and explicability [33, 58]). A final source is 
context-specific values that are not covered by the first 
two sources. Instead, they derive from analysis of a spe-
cific context in the first phase and of stakeholder values 
in particular. Moreover, it should be noted that phase 
two does not just involve empirical investigations. This 
phase has a distinct normative flavour in the sense that 
it results in the identification of values to be upheld in 
further design from a normative point of view. Phase 
two also involves conceptual investigations geared at 
interpreting (in context) and conceptualising relevant 
values.
3. Formulating design requirements: the third phase 
involves the formulation of design requirements on 
the basis of identified values (phase 2) and contex-
tual analysis (phase 1). Here, tools such as the value 
Fig. 5  United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Source: [55]
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hierarchy [59] can be useful for mutually relating val-
ues and design requirements, or for translating values 
into design requirements (Fig. 5). We suggest that the 
translation of values into design requirements is some-
what different from the sets of values formulated in 
the second phase. For example, the first set of values 
might be derived from the SDGs. These values will 
be promoted by the design. They are typically trans-
lated into design requirements formulated as criteria 
that should be met as much as possible. The second 
set of values are those that should be respected, par-
ticularly in regards to AI. Here, the AI4SG principles 
are especially helpful for formulating more specific 
design requirements. Requirements will most likely 
be formulated as constraints or boundary conditions 
rather than as criteria that should be achieved as much 
as possible. Boundary conditions thus set the deon-
tological constraints that any design must meet to be 
ethically (minimally) acceptable. The third set of con-
textual values, the analysis of context and particularly 
stakeholders, will most likely play an important role 
in determining how values should be translated into 
design requirements.
4. Prototyping: the fourth phase is building prototype tests 
that meet design requirements. This idea is in line with 
what is more generally described in VSD as a value-ori-
ented mock-up, prototype, or field deployment [8, p. 62]. 
We propose extending this phase to the entire life-cycle 
of AI technology. Even if technologies initially meet 
value-based design requirements, they may develop in 
unexpected ways and yield undesirable effects. They 
could fail to achieve the values for which they were 
intended, or they may have unforeseen side effects that 
require consideration of additional values [60]. In such 
cases, there is reason to redesign the technology and 
complete another iteration of the cycle.
To ensure adoptability and illustrate the efficacy of this 
approach, we provide timely examples below. These exam-
ples offer a clear illustration of how the process works by 
situating it within a figurative context for a specific AI 
system.
6  The AI4SG‑VSD design process in action: 
SARS‑CoV‑2 contact tracing apps
On Tuesday, April 7, 2020, the Robert Koch Institute 
(RKI)—the German federal research facility responsible 
for disease control and prevention – prompted German 
citizens with smartphones and smartwatches to voluntarily 
share their health data to track the spread of the COVID-19 
virus [61]. The RKI is rolling out a new app called Corona 
Datenspende (Corona Data Donation), which allows users 
to voluntarily and anonymously share their health data. 
The data aids scientists in determining the symptoms cor-
related with COVID-19 infection as well as the distribution 
of infections across the nation. It further helps with gaug-
ing the efficacy of public health measures to ameliorate 
the situation. The app allows the user to record their age, 
height, weight, gender, health metrics (such as physical 
activity, body temperature, sleep behaviour, or heart rate), 
and postal code. Lothar Wieler, head of the RKI, said that 
the information collected by the app would “help to bet-
ter estimate where and how fast Covid-19 is spreading in 
Germany” [62].
The RKI explicitly states that data collected from indi-
vidual users is labelled with pseudonyms. Personal user 
information, such as names and addresses, remain private 
through the use of artificial identifiers to de-identify user 
data. However, this leaves open the possibility of re-identi-
fying data subjects.3 Likewise, the machine learning systems 
underlying the app are designed to:
recognise symptoms that are associated with, among 
other things, a coronavirus infection. These include, 
for example, an increased resting heart rate and 
changes in sleep and activity behaviour. The donated 
data will only be used for scientific purposes. After 
careful preparation, the data flows into a map that visu-
ally shows the spread of potentially infected people 
down to the zip code level. [61]
Although the app is still in its infancy regarding stages 
of deployment, we can illustrate the design of the Corona 
Datenspende (albeit ex post facto in this case) using the 
framework described above (see Fig. 6).
3 It bears mentioning that pseudonymisation is not equal to anonymi-
sation. In fact, according to GDPR, only completely anonymised 
data are outside the scope of the regulation. Pseudonymised data 
does not have the same legal consequences as anonymised data due 
to a salient difference: anonymising data means to irreversibly delete 
any potential link to the person the data originally belonged to. Con-
versely, pseudonymising data means to de-identify data through arti-
ficial identifiers—leaving open the possibility of re-identifying data 
subjects. Although pseudonymisation is considered a secure means of 
storing personal information, it does not compare to anonymisation 
as the legal consequences are substantially different: the GDPR still 
applies to pseudonymised data [75, 76].
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6.1  Context
In this case, the context for use—the COVID-19 pan-
demic—can be understood as the motivating factor 
behind a technological solution. The immediate (health) 
crisis demands swift action to stifle the further spread of 
the virus. Actions are also undertaken with the desire to 
return to less strict measures at some point post-pandemic. 
A prima facie analysis of the values at play here point 
to tensions between immediate concerns for public health 
and more enduring ones for economic stability/prosperity. 
Development of an app can be targeted to (attempt to) bal-
ance this tension, as a tracking and tracing app may assist 
in the resumption of certain societal activities such as trav-
elling or work. By tracing potential infections, resumption 
can unfold in a way that still reduces health risks as much 
as possible.
6.2  Value identification
6.2.1  Values promoted by the design: the UN sustainable 
development goals
The design of Corona Datenspende can be said to support 
the third SDG of “good health and well-being” (see Fig. 5). 
Although the impromptu technology was introduced in 
response to an immediate context, in situ deployment and 
use may encourage applications outside the original context 
(perhaps in other countries, or for other illnesses).4
6.2.2  Values respected by the design, with focus on those 
specific to AI: respect for human autonomy, 
prevention of harm (nonmaleficence), fairness, 
and explicability
Respect for human autonomy: here, autonomy refers to the 
balance between human decision-making power and its 
abdication to AI systems. Machines should be designed not 
only to promote human autonomy but also to constrain the 
abdication of too much decision-making power. This is espe-
cially true in areas where the value of human decision-mak-
ing outweighs the efficacy of the machine’s decision-making 
capabilities [58]. Such respect aligns with the sixteenth SDG 
(Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), particularly 16.7: 
Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representa-
tive decision-making at all levels [55].
4 Goal 3 target 3.B more aptly aims to “support the research and 
development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and 
noncommunicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, 
provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in 
accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use 
to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public 
health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all” [55].
Fig. 6  VSD design process for AI technologies
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Prevention of harm (nonmaleficence): nonmaleficence 
means understanding systemic capabilities and limits to pre-
vent potential risks and harms from manifesting in systems. 
When it comes to how individuals control their personal 
data, for example, questions of data privacy and security 
are often invoked [58]. RKI explicitly states that it does not 
collect personal user information beyond the level of postal 
codes (used to understand transmission densities). But pri-
vacy concerns exist at the community level nonetheless, par-
ticularly in regards to practices for storing, using, sharing, 
archiving, and destroying collected data. Risks of regional 
gerrymandering, targeted solicitation and/or discrimination 
are not excluded solely by delimiting data collection to the 
level of postal codes. Harm may also occur due to specific 
ways the app is used. This is especially true if the app is used 
to not only map the spread of the virus but also trace individ-
uals as potential bearers of the disease and ‘risk factors’. We 
discuss these in more detail below, under contextual values.
Fairness: fairness is typically described and defined in 
different ways, creating ambiguity in meaning. It can also 
be specified across different points in the life cycle of AI 
technologies, including their relations with human beings. 
Here, fairness can be framed as justice. Floridi et al. (2018b) 
sum up various definitions of justice in three ways. The first 
definition of justice is using AI to correct past wrongs, such 
as by eliminating unfair discrimination. The second is ensur-
ing the use of AI actually creates benefits that are shared 
(or at least shareable). The third is preventing the creation 
of new harms, such as undermining existing social struc-
tures. This general understanding of fairness as justice aligns 
directly with the sixteenth SDG (Peace, Justice and Strong 
Institutions).
Explicability: to support the other values, employed AI 
systems must be explicable. This means the inner workings 
of these systems must be intelligible (not opaque). There 
must also be at least one agent who is accountable for the 
way it works (an agent who understands the way the system 
works and is thus responsible for its actions [58]).
6.2.3  Context‑specific values not covered by 1) and 2). 
These underpin analyses of specific contexts 
and focus especially on stakeholder values
Although the German government stated that Corona Dat-
enspende would be voluntary, scholars pointed out that the 
app might nevertheless be applied in ways that endanger 
the voluntariness of use. For example, it could be used to 
allow access to certain services (such as public transport) 
or become required by employers for their employees. 
Such potential uses might, in turn, also invite individuals to 
misuse the app to retain maximum freedom of movement. 
Users might even conceal certain contacts by turning off 
their phones, which could again contribute to health risks.
Similar concerns were voiced in other countries. In the 
Netherlands, sixty scientists and experts wrote an open letter 
to the Dutch government warning about a number of risks 
and unintended consequences associated with a tracing and 
tracking app [63]. Among other things, they observed that 
such an app might lead to stigmatisation and discrimination. 
Depending on how it was used, it could endanger fundamen-
tal human rights such as the right of association. They also 
drew attention to the fact that an app might give a false sense 
of security, leading people to follow requirements for social 
distancing less strictly. This would ultimately increase, 
rather than decrease, health risks.
Many of the risks and potential side effects mentioned by 
scholars regarding SARS-CoV-2 apps map onto the values 
discussed above, particularly health values (under 1) and 
non-maleficence, and justice, autonomy, and explicability 
(under 2). For example, a false sense of security relates to 
the value of health. Privacy and voluntariness relate to the 
value of autonomy. Stigmatisation and discrimination relate 
to the value of fairness [e.g. 64–66]. Some values, such as 
the right of association or security against hacking and mis-
use, are less clearly related to one of the SDGs but could 
perhaps be subsumed under nonmaleficence.
More clearly, the issues show that we should consider val-
ues in context to gain full awareness of what is at stake and 
how we might translate our concerns into tangible design 
requirements. In this specific case, it is particularly impor-
tant to consider the behavioural effects of contact-tracing 
apps. It is also crucial to view values within a broader sys-
temic context. Even if a contextual value analysis fails to 
reveal completely new values, it will nonetheless be crucial 
for understanding which values are at stake for a specific 
application, how they should be understood in that specific 
case, and how they might translate into design requirements.
6.3  Formulating design requirements
To illustrate how tools such as the value hierarchy (Fig. 4) 
can be used to visualise and aid designers in translating 
abstract values into technical design requirements, we pro-
vide a specific instance of the tool below (Fig. 7). There are, 
of course, any number of iterations occupying any given 
vector in the hierarchy. This is just one example. Similarly, 
and to reiterate here, the desirability of using such a tool 
is the aid it provides designers. Designers are tasked with 
visualising and opening up potential design pathways. The 
tool helps in understanding the avenues for value translation, 
which are often abstract. These avenues translate values into 
concrete design requirements, and vice versa.
We chose the value of nonmaleficence because it is 
more abstract, thus illustrating the utility of the tool. Non-
maleficence was first translated through two of the AI4SG 
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principles (5 and 6), and then into technical design require-
ments. In this paradigm, AI4SG principles are adopted as 
norms – rightly so, given their framing by Floridi et al. [67] 
as imperatives. Naturally, any given context for use, val-
ues, and technology specifics will implicate any number of 
combinations. There is no exclusive or exhaustive route that 
might satisfy value translation, which can move in a bottom-
up direction (design requirements norms values) as well as 
the top-down diction (values norms design requirements) 
shown above (see also Longo et al. [67]). We could just 
as easily (and probably should) use situational fairness as 
the normative tool for operationalising other values, such 
as explicability (transparent dataset collection, use, storage, 
and destruction [for example, see 68]) and justice (promot-
ing non-discriminatory laws and practices through unbiased 
compliance [for example, see the use of Fairness Warnings 
and/or Fair-MAML described by 69]).
At a functional level, the normative structure of AI4SG 
values supports avoiding (most) ethical harms associated 
with AI systems. However, it does not guarantee new AI 
applications will actively contribute to social good per se. 
Combined with real operationalisation of the SDGs, the 
higher level values listed above allow for the development 
of more salient AI systems that contribute to social good 
(or global beneficence). This multi-tiered approach, which 
couples AI-specific values with stakeholder values and their 
application to SDG attainment via AI4SG norms, can miti-
gate dangers posed by ethical white-washing. Such white-
washing occurs when AI technologies that fail to respect 
some fundamental ethical principles are legitimised [70–72].
Regardless, this type of visualisation can be used across 
different sources for values. As listed above, sources include 
the SDGs and stakeholders. Visualisation helps determine 
how related values can produce technical design require-
ments that are both similar and different. Research pro-
jects could do this empirically, by taking any particular AI 
technology and providing thorough value-design require-
ment translations to determine the effectiveness of this 
approach. All in all, our aim is to help designers begin to 
design for various values more effectively. Often, these val-
ues are conflated erroneously or side-lined altogether.
6.4  Prototyping
Prototyping involves building mock-ups of the technol-
ogy in question according to design requirements laid 
out in the previous step. Technology is moved from the 
more controlled space of the lab or design environment 
and in situ. This, of course, implicates stakeholder values 
both directly and indirectly. Various design decisions may 
prove recalcitrant at this point. Alternatively, unforeseen 
recalcitrant behaviour could emerge to implicate other 
values. Assuming limited deployment of the technology, 
it could be recalled into the design space so corrective 
modifications might be implemented. Given the stakes at 
play and the urgency for amelioration, the crisis situation 
behind the inception of Corona Datenspende invited direct 
deployment rather than prototyping. But while tempting, 
this may ultimately prove an unwise course of action. AI 
systems possess significant risks, especially those that are 
predicated on such large quantities of data subjects. Small 
scale deployment or in-house testing of the efficacy and 
fidelity of the app’s underlying systems are a necessary 
(albeit insufficient) condition. Absent this condition, it is 
difficult to ensure the responsible development of an AI 
system of this type. Absent responsible development, the 
app is far less likely to achieve positive ethical/societal 
values (such as beneficence, justice, explicability, auton-
omy, and associated distal SDGs) or to reduce ethical AI 
risks (such as nonmaleficence).
It must be stressed that prototyping should not be lim-
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Fig. 7  Translating the reduction of harm (nonmaleficence) into design requirements through AI4SG norms
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Prototyping must take into account behaviour, societal 
effects, and their subsequent impacts on values. Once 
again, the tracing and tracking app is a case in point. Some 
value issues, such as privacy, can be addressed through 
technical choices (e.g. pseudonymisation, local data stor-
age, and the automatic destruction of data after a certain 
period of time). But other value concerns require insight 
into the behavioural impacts of this sort of app. Behav-
ioural impacts are very hard, if not impossible, to predict 
reliably without some form of prototyping. At the very 
least, prediction requires small-scale testing in situ. It is 
therefore advisable to go through a number of trials for 
such apps, scaling up from very small-scale testing with 
mock-ups to test settings of increasing size (not unlike 
what is done in medical experiments with new drugs). 
Testing trajectories might also reveal new values brought 
to bear that need to be taken into account. Doing so would 
then trigger a new iteration of the development cycle.
7  Conclusion
This paper discusses how AI systems can pose certain chal-
lenges to a value-sensitive design approach in technology. 
These result from the use of machine learning in AI, which 
creates two challenges for VSD. First, it may be not at all 
clear (to humans) how an AI system has learned certain 
things. The inherent opacity of AI systems requires paying 
attention to values such as transparency, explainability, and 
accountability. Second, AI systems may adapt themselves 
in ways that ‘disembody’ the values embedded in them by 
VSD designers. To deal with these challenges, we proposed 
an extension of VSD to the whole life cycle of AI systems 
design. More specifically, we have shown how the AI4SG 
principles iterated by Floridi et al. can be integrated as VSD 
norms when considering AI design. To integrate the AI4SG 
principles into a more systematic VSD approach, we pro-
posed a design process consisting of four iterative basic 
steps: contextual analysis, value identification, translation 
of values into design requirements, and prototyping.
At the core of our model lies a two-tiered approach to 
ensuring values in the design of AI technologies. The first 
tier consists of a real commitment to contributing to social 
good (beneficence) through AI. The second tier involves 
the formulation of (and adherence to) a number of concrete 
AI4SG principles. AI4SG factors could help avoid most 
ethical harms, even without the first tier. But there is no 
guarantee at all that new AI applications will actively con-
tribute to social good. So without the second tier, there is a 
danger of contributing to societal challenges. This occurs 
when SDGs are used to legitimise AI technologies that 
do not respect some fundamental ethical principles. Here 
lies the danger of ethical white-washing, which is already 
visible on the webpages of some large companies.
In addition to these two tiers of values, we have argued 
that contextual values are highly important (or at least 
the contextual interpretation of values from the two tiers). 
Contextual interpretation is necessary for understanding 
which values are at stake for a specific application, and 
how to translate relevant values into design requirements.
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